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Engineering the Empire: British Water Supply
Systems and Colonial Societies, 1850–1900
John Broich
A s a revolution in urban governance swept Britain from the 1840s on-ward, a revolution in water supply and drainage infrastructure followed.The apogee of that movement was a water supply system called the
gravitation scheme that reforming municipalities aspired to build. It entailed dras-
tically reshaping landscapes in the hinterlands of cities by damming rivers, raising
lakes, or flooding valleys and then piping water under pressure to sometimes distant
cities; it also, promoters hoped, would reform urban environments and societies
at the same time. Between 1840 and the end of the century, engineers in Britain
executed it approximately one hundred times, but the gravitation scheme had a
life beyond the bounds of Britain. In the second half of the nineteenth century,
engineers—usually the very same individuals who had carried them out in Britain—
introduced the scheme to cities such as Bombay, Colombo, Hong Kong, and
Singapore. There, the gravitation scheme also had a transformative influence; it
was a project of environmental and technical change that helped to solidify the
modernizing colonial state.
This water system was a practical solution to the challenge of providing growing
urban populations in Britain with water, but it represented more than that to the
advocates of improvement in cities such as Bradford, Glasgow, and Manchester.
For them, the design was ideally suited to accomplish goals that combined physical
and moral amelioration. In their eyes, it was the best technology for keeping cities
flush with water for drinking and bearing away human and industrial poisons, and
because it was presumed to be the best method for introducing water to all homes
in all corners of the city, they believed that it was the best way to induce working-
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class families—who they imagined were averse to water use—to use it for drinking
(as an alternative to alcohol) and for eliminating demoralizing grime. In other
words, only if the poor would adopt more water usage could the warrens of the
cities be rid of environmental and moral filth. In the empire, those who promoted
the gravitation scheme were guided by much the same motivations, but there, the
targets of water reform were chiefly identified by race rather than class.
Confident that they were spreading enlightenment and civilization, colonial
officials and engineers sought to impose this technological-environmental system
on the landscapes of the empire. These efforts had long-standing consequences
for both environmental and social regimes. On the subcontinent, and in Sri Lanka,
Japan, and China, engineers diverted rivers, created lakes, drowned villages, and
dislodged farmers in order to provide sometimes distant cities with water. The
projects linked this environmental change in the hinterlands to social change in
the cities. The new colonial water supplies often replaced traditional water systems;
where control over water sources was formerly decentralized, water systems became
more and more centralized. “Official” water sources proliferated, along with official
instruction to use them.1
Historians and political theorists argue that reforming the conditions of urban
life was an important unwritten strategy of the “improvers” of liberal Victorian
Britain and its empire, in order to eliminate dangers and impediments from the
burgeoning city and to enable townspeople to experience “modern” life. In The
Rule of Freedom Patrick Joyce develops Foucauldian ideas in examining how British
leaders ordered social life by ordering the Victorian city. By lighting the city, making
it easy to move about the city, and thereby making it easy to comprehend the city,
successful rule, he argues, was achieved by taking steps to enable urban subjects
to lead the sort of life that realized modern society and reinforced the state. Citing
“the agency of running water,” Joyce suggests, in a tantalizingly brief treatment,
that water supply and sewerage systems in Britain steered behavior, introduced
new standards of normalcy in everyday life, and individuated subjects by creating
what Joyce calls the “hygienic self.”2 Again, intervention was not on its face co-
ercive; he writes, “Liberalism [was] a variant of governmentality which sought to
secure interventions in conduct which were neither arbitrary nor direct.”3 David
Scott extends similar ideas on liberalism as a strategy of power to the empire. For
Scott, the colonial state proceeded by eliminating or rearranging existing condi-
tions that, in the eyes of imperial authorities, held native society in a nonmodern
or “unimproved” state. The task of the modernizing governor was to reformulate
conditions “to oblige subjects to transform themselves in a certain, that is im-
proving direction.”4 The case of the gravitation scheme, undertaken in both Glas-
gow and Hong Kong, reveals that the creation of urban systems as a strategy of
1 Christopher Hamlin has shown that, at the beginning of the sanitary and water reform movement,
sanitarians such as Edwin Chadwick fought and won contests to determine how “improvement” was
to be defined and achieved; that is, it was decided to treat the side effects of poverty, poisonous by-
products that threatened the British workforce and threatened to expand into middle-class circles,
instead of the root causes of poverty and disease. Christopher Hamlin, Public Health and Social Justice
in an Age of Chadwick, Britain, 1800–1854 (Cambridge, 1998).
2 Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City (London, 2003), 70–75.
3 Ibid., 70.
4 David Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,” Social Text 43 (Autumn 1995): 200.
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modern governance was reproduced; tactics of state power were not always distinct
in Britain and the empire.5
Social and environmental conditions in both places certainly were distinct, but
the engineers who undertook the gravitation scheme in the empire betrayed a
failure to appreciate these differences. They approached the task of lifting the
gravitation scheme from the landscapes of Britain and superimposing it on the
empire with great confidence—and largely unmodified designs and procedures.
But that confidence was sorely tested in the face of multiple fronts of resistance.
The difficulties of such attempts at straightforward imposition have been the focus
of much recent work by historians of science, technology, and empire.6 In Science,
Technology, and Medicine in Colonial India, David Arnold describes the difficulty
of transferring technologies from metropole to empire without emendation.7 Ar-
nold and other historians argue that technology transfer was tempered by British
political and administrative exigencies and economic strategies that sometimes
favored limits on proliferation, but more important, technology transfer was com-
plicated by Indian observers who did not share British engineers’ and politicians’
faith in its advantages.8 Arnold and Mark Harrison describe the resistance and
constraints offered by Indian society to British public health measures, while others
have described social and cultural checks on the introduction of British agricultural,
irrigation, rail, and scientific forestry initiatives.9 Resistance was based on a complex
of related motivations, from a resentment of adopting technologies or techniques
that clearly benefited British officials or capitalists to an aversion to funding projects
or programs through taxes, to anger over disruptions to local land use or other
traditions, and to straightforward doubt about the new technologies’ efficacy.
Similarly, local inhabitants resisted the water projects from Karachi to Colombo
and beyond because they resented paying for a project initiated by the British,
because they doubted the project’s necessity, and indeed for all the justifications
highlighted by Arnold and Harrison. The gravitation scheme inspired resistance
for another reason that appears more rarely in the literature: religion. Townspeople
in at least two Indian cities resisted the creation of water schemes because they
would interfere with traditional worship practices.
5 Joyce draws analogies between certain expressions of metropolitan and colonial governmentality
but, presumably because of a lack of case studies, fails to recognize the water infrastructure of the
colonial city as the domain of governmentaility, just as it was in Britain. Joyce, Rule of Freedom, 253–57.
6 This work has turned away from an earlier tendency to simply describe how technologies were
thrust upon colonial societies as tools of empire. See, e.g., Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire:
Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, 1981).
7 David Arnold, Science, Technology, and Medicine in Colonial India, 1760–1947 (Cambridge, 2000),
92.
8 Ibid., 92–93; Mark Harrison, Public Health in British India: Anglo-Indian Preventive Medicine,
1859–1914 (Cambridge, 1994), 99–116, and elsewhere; R. J. Henry, “Technology Transfer and Its
Constraints: Early Warnings from Agricultural Development in Colonial India,” in Technology and the
Raj: Western Technology and Technical Transfers to India, 1700–1947, ed. Roy Macleod and Deepak
Kumar (London, 1995), 51–77.
9 David Arnold, Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century
India (Berkeley, 1993), 17–18, 238; Ravi Ahuja, “‘The Bridge Builders’: Some Notes on Railways,
Pilgrimage, and the British ‘Civilizing Mission’ in Colonial India,” in Colonialism as Civilising Mission:
Cultural Ideology in British India, ed. Harald Fischer-Tiné and Michael Mann (London, 2004), 106–8;
Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, “State Forestry and Social Conflict in British India,” in Peasant
Resistance in India, 1858–1914, ed. David Hardiman (Delhi, 1992), 258–95.
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More important, this case presents an example of an obstacle that the literature
on science and technology transfer does not deal with sufficiently—the environment
itself.10 Soil conditions, earthquakes, and especially the tropical climate provided the
most serious barriers to water supply engineers. Designs drafted in London and
materials tested in the Lake District performed differently, and sometimes disas-
trously, in the hills of Sri Lanka or mud of Singapore. Since the gravitation schemes
described here were undertaken not by elected municipal bodies but rather by
provincial governments or Crown agents in London, the obstructions of the land-
scape proved more challenging than those of defiant townspeople.11 The theme of
environmental resistance has been well developed in the environmental histories
analyzing the projects of modernizing states, whether looking at failed attempts at
acclimatizing commercial species to various parts of the globe or systems of flood
control.12 Although the modernizing central state brought capital and political will
to projects of environmental changes, the landscapes it encountered never reacted
like the blank canvases on which experts had drawn their designs. The case of the
gravitation scheme, then, provides an opportunity to draw on the environment-
centered picture of friction offered by environmental historians and the socially
oriented depiction of resistance offered by historians of science and technology.
Despite the difficulties of environmental resistance and social antipathy, engi-
neers succeeded in negotiating the gravitation scheme into new social and physical
terrains. The gravitation scheme was the boldest rendering of reformers’ dreams
of a physically and morally healthy, productive, modern populace. In both Britain
and the empire, moral governance was translated into water governance through
the same technology. Through rearranging the environment, through guiding the
behavior of water, the modernizing state found new ways to guide certain behavior,
even in the individual household, without any apparent direct intervention. The
obvious point of intervention was in the hinterland, where landscapes and com-
munities were violently overturned by gravitation schemes; in cities, the ordering
of society through water—and the reification of state power—was, and has largely
remained, out of sight.
THE GRAVITATION SCHEME: A TECHNICAL, SOCIAL, AND MORAL FIX
This model water system ultimately came into being because the growing industrial
towns of midcentury Britain had water problems. Their concentrated populations
10 Exceptions include some studies on British India’s canal systems as led by Elizabeth Whitcombe’s
important work in which she describes the waterlogging, salinization, and epidemiological consequences
of the projects and Timothy Mitchell’s examination of the High Aswan Dam’s epidemiological and
social backfire. See Elizabeth Whitcombe, Agrarian Conditions in Northern India: The United Provinces
under British Rule, 1860–1900 (Berkeley, 1972); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics,
Modernity (Berkeley, 2002); Rohan D’Souza surveys the literature on British water systems on the
subcontinent in “Water in British India: The Making of a Colonial Hydrology,” History Compass 4
(2006): 621–28.
11 Although, Harrison notes that public health initiatives were restrained by the fear of inciting civil
unrest; Harrison, Public Health in British India, 116.
12 See, for only a few examples, Donald Worster, Dust Bowl (New York, 1979); Warren Dean, Brazil
and the Struggle for Rubber: A Study in Environmental History (Cambridge, 1987); Jared Orsi, Haz-
ardous Metropolis: Flooding and Urban Ecology in Los Angeles (Berkeley, 2004).
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generated large volumes of waste in very cramped quarters, which made it difficult
and sometimes impossible to remove waste from proximity to habitations and local
water sources at the very moment when increasing populations demanded larger
and larger volumes of water free from human and industrial poisons.
At the same time, sanitary experts preached that fresh water must be supplied
throughout towns, made available within the living quarters of townspeople of all
classes at all times, and that water, once dirtied by use, must be drained away
immediately. A prominent disease theory of the time stated that epidemic bred in
environments with stagnant, dirty water; such places emanated a sort of disease-
inducing cloud—a “miasma.” Sanitarians such as the renowned Edwin Chadwick
and a series of official inquiries stated that public health depended on moving
water through the urban body at large and thus eliminating miasmas.
The state, embodied by parliamentary committees and royal commissioners,
found its citizens unwilling or unable to safeguard its interests. Cholera struck the
country in 1831; typhus, in 1837: the government’s registrar general showed
alarming rates of mortality in Britain’s cities.13 The unwatered, unwashed cities
threatened to unravel, or at least disastrously foul, the social fabric. The solution,
in the words of the 1844–45 commission, was to “promote habits of cleanliness
among the population,” but it complained that authorities could not compel the
working class to use more water unless it was “readily accessible at all times, without
trouble.”14 Only with universal, affordable water service could city dwellers and
landlords be required by law to connect their properties to water supplies. Only
if the state better managed natural resources could it better manage the behavior
of its people and ultimately preserve itself.15
Water reformers were also spurred by an ethical rationale. In reformers’ eyes,
cramped, unflushed environments harbored moral disease as well as miasmas. Phi-
lanthropists and sanitarians such as Edwin Chadwick saw that the poor were un-
willing or unable to obtain water from a distance if it was not piped into their
habitations, and reformers knew that, even when landlords had laid on a water
supply to their properties, most water companies did not provide water under
sufficient pressure to reach the upper floors of poor tenements. Sanitary officials
and philanthropic campaigners believed that working-class people gave in to hope-
lessness and spiritual corruption if they had insufficient access to clean water and
could not clean their habitations and bodies. In 1850, the Edinburgh Review stated,
“There is a most fatal and certain connexion between physical uncleanliness and
moral pollution: the condition of the population becomes invariably assimilated
to that of their habitation.”16 Many reformers closely linked impure water supplies
to the abuse of alcohol. Reverend John Garwood of the London City Mission
wrote in 1859, “The universal testimony of our Missionaries is, that . . . a very
large amount of drunkenness is occasioned by the great difficulty of obtaining
13 Second Report of the Commissioners for Inquiring into the State of Large Towns and Populous Districts,
Parliamentary Papers, vol. 18 (London, 1845), 2.
14 Ibid., 50.
15 For an important work on Chadwick and his assumptions about disease and society, see Hamlin,
Public Health and Social Justice.
16 W. O’Brien, “Supply of Water to the Metropolis,” Edinburgh Review 91 (April 1850): 384.
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pure water to drink in many of the poor parts of London.”17 The poor would
then drag themselves and their families down into despair and cease to be useful,
productive members of society. A writer in Dickens’s weekly journal, Household
Words, anticipated that once there was “a constant supply of water at high pressure
within reach of every housewife’s thumb . . . we shall have advanced also in the
moral and mental discipline of urban life to a better state.”18
From the late 1840s, Britain witnessed a “water reformation,” as town councils,
motivated by these public health and social reform concerns, replaced old water
companies—and nearly all towns were supplied by commercial enterprises at the
time. Town councils usually undertook new works construction very soon after
purchasing, or “municipalizing,” their water companies, as councils searched for
larger, cleaner water sources. Of the roughly 180 towns and cities that munici-
palized existing enterprises or inaugurated new water utilities from around 1840
until the end of the century, the majority secured new water sources and built
new works within a only few years of eliminating old companies.19 These water
projects, along with other efforts to deal with the problems of growing towns,
demanded the significant expansion in the rights and responsibilities of town coun-
cils across England and Wales.20 The councils had to receive legal authority from
Parliament to purchase companies or to offer new water supplies, to buy land, to
secure water sources, and to raise funds to finance all of these. Most often, town
councils financed water reform by selling municipal stock and using water rates
to service the amassed debt.
At the same time local governments acquired the authority and means of trans-
forming their cities, the gravitation scheme was becoming the preeminent water
supply technology. Slowly emerging in the 1820s and 1830s, this began as a simple
adaptation of the mill reservoir.21 For centuries, mill owners had impounded water
for the purpose of using falling water to turn wheels for textile or other manu-
facturing; they dammed rivers or embanked and raised ponds that were situated
at an elevation above their mills and then sent water rushing down a channel that
passed through or beside their works. In the first decades of the nineteenth century,
a few mill owners began selling surplus water to local manufacturing communities
17 John Garwood, quoted in W. Archdall O’Dougherty, Water for Domestic Use: Evils Attending the
Use of Impure Water, to Health, to Purse, and to Morals (n.p., 1862), 21. This source quotes many
reformers on what they viewed as the close connection between poor water quality and alcohol abuse
among the poor. Also, Edwin Chadwick linked insufficient water to the dirty state of the masses and
their quarters and the dirty state of his or her quarters to the disgrace of the working-class individual
and that disgrace to the predilection to drink. He reported in 1842 that the “undrained” abode “has
an effect on the moral habits by acting as a strong and often irresistible provocative to the use of
fermented liquors.” Edwin Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population
of Great Britain (1842; repr., Edinburgh, 1965), 196–97.
18 John Morely, “Piping Days,” Household Words 10 (14 October 1854): 197–98.
19 Arthur Silverstone, The Purchase of Gas and Water Works: With the Latest Statistics of Municipal
Gas and Water Supply (London, 1881), 88–125.
20 The 1835 Municipal Corporations Act eliminated all existing corporations—the city of London’s
local government excluded—and created town councils in their places. These new councils had relatively
few responsibilities specified at first. See Derek Fraser, “Introduction: Municipal Reform in Historical
Perspective,” in his Municipal Reform and the Industrial City (New York, 1982), 1–6, and Power and
Authority in the Victorian City (New York, 1979), 164.
21 Peter Ellerton Russell, “John Frederic La Trobe-Bateman, FRS, Water Engineer, 1810–1889”
(master’s thesis, University of Manchester, 1980), 59–60.
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Figure 1—A schematic of the gravitation scheme (figure by John Broich).
for domestic use. The practice expanded along with the growth of towns. By 1835,
there were a dozen reservoirs that served, at least partially, to provide a town with
water.22 From the 1840s, the scale and number of the projects increased as mu-
nicipal officials and sanitary experts saw the potential for the gravitation scheme
to solve the practical problems of urban water supply and to achieve their social
goals.
The system required a superabundant source of water such as a river, a lake, a
group of streams, a number of springs, or a combination of these. The greater
the volume of water to be collected, the more likely the project would prove
sufficient to meet the future wants of the city and support the expansion of the
population, and the city’s industrial productivity, for generations to come. Because
the gravitation scheme drew on water sources in the city’s hinterland, well away
from settlements, it appealed to sanitarians and engineers who thought water
sources near to cities were liable to become contaminated and sometimes had
proven insufficient to the wants of the city. Then, the method required that this
water be accumulated and reserved, perhaps by diverting streams into an artificial
reservoir, embanking a lake to hold additional water, or enclosing a valley through
which a river passed at one end. The reservoir had to be built at an elevation above
the city. An aqueduct or iron pipeline delivered the new water supply to the city
in need—whether ten miles away or one hundred—and because the water arrived
from a height, no pumping was required to convey it over a distance (it was
because of this feature that the schemes were called “gravitation schemes”). The
engineering and sanitary consensus held that all towns’ water supplies should be
delivered under high pressure without the aid of expensive steam pumping. The
poor could not be compelled to reform their water habits until the water was
actually universally available throughout the city, and this constant high pressure
would make that so (see fig. 1).
The gravitation system came to predominate over alternatives such as well fields,
schemes for filtering river water, and schemes involving pumping, in part because
a coterie of influential engineers promoted it to town officials throughout Britain.
Thomas Hawkesley, a member of the Royal Commission on the Health of Towns
and one of Britain’s most celebrated water engineers, built gravitation systems for
Leicester and Rochdale; James Simpson, vice president of the Institution for Civil
Engineering, designed schemes for Aberdeen and Liverpool; chief engineering
inspector of Parliament’s Local Government Board, Robert Rawlinson, promoted
22 Ibid., 25, 59–60.
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a gravitation scheme (never built) for London.23 But the engineer who led the
way in transforming the schemes from small millponds to monumental projects,
and who constructed by far the most of these schemes (around fifty), was John
Frederic La Trobe Bateman (1810–89).24 Edwin Chadwick himself wrote Bateman
in 1844, imploring him to become a specialist in the process.25 From the 1840s
through the next several decades, he submitted several gravitation schemes per
year to local authorities throughout Britain.26 His greatest projects, the Longendale
and Thirlmere reservoirs for Manchester and his Loch Katrine system for Glasgow,
manufactured some of the largest lakes in Britain and represented some of the
most considerable public expenditures of any kind of their age. Glasgow spent 1
million pounds on creating a reservoir nine miles long and one mile wide at its
widest.27 Though it was more expensive to create than traditional well schemes,
the gravitation scheme multiplied because engineers found it effective; it satisfied
social goals, satisfied orthodox sanitary principles, and therefore became dogma
among the engineering and sanitarian establishment.28 In the empire, these same
engineers demonstrated their belief in the universality of these engineering and
social principles.
EXPORTING A DESIGN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSFORMATION
The gravitation scheme spread to the cities of the empire because colonial officials
mimicked Britain’s state-of-the-art engineering. Bombay’s chief engineer, Henry
23 Leicester, Rochdale, and other towns built Hawkesley gravitation schemes; see Scott Edward Roney,
“Trial and Error in the Pursuit of Public Health: Leicester, 1849–1891” (PhD diss., University of Ten-
nessee, Knoxville, 2002), 80; Leicester Water Undertaking, 1847–1874 (Leicester, 1974), 59; and Rebe
Taylor, Rochdale Retrospect (Rochdale, 1955), 127–28. Simpson promoted the system for Aberdeen and
Liverpool; see James Simpson, Report on the Most Efficient Means of Obtaining an Increased Supply of
Water to the City of Aberdeen (Aberdeen, 1855), 11; James Simpson and James Newlands, Liverpool Water
Supply (Liverpool, 1849), 10, 34, 48–50. For Rawlinson, see The Times, 2 June 1898, 6.
24 It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of his gravitation systems. Even his only biographer
can offer only a range of the number of reservoirs he completed, seventy to eighty, and some of those
were not for drinking water. Bateman also promoted some schemes that were adopted by town councils
but never completed. I derive my figure of fifty from Russell, “John Frederic La Trobe-Bateman,” 176,
182, 199–200, 211, 263; and J. F. Bateman, “On a Constant Water Supply for London: A Paper read
at a Meeting of the Health Department of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science”
(n.p., 1867; in the possession of the Institution for Civil Engineering, London), 1. Geoffrey Binnie
counts thirty completed; Geoffrey Binnie, “The Evolution of British Dams,” in Dams, ed. Donald C.
Jackson (Aldershot, 1998), 94.
25 Russell, “John Frederic La Trobe-Bateman,” 133. Chadwick, of course, was not solely responsible
for Bateman’s conversion to a professional water supply engineer, but Bateman’s biographer attributes
much influence to the activity of the Health of Towns Association and the 1844–45 Health of Towns
Commission; see ibid., 105. Prior to 1844, Bateman had promoted only one project devoted solely
to drinking water for Brighton in 1842; it was completed in 1849; see ibid., 124.
26 Russell, “John Frederic La Trobe-Bateman,” 176, 182, 211.
27 Irene Maver, Glasgow (Edinburgh, 2000), 91.
28 Gravitation schemes quickly became renowned for their great cost, and some critics saw their
designers as profligate. Russell, “John Frederic La Trobe-Bateman,” 207. In Ceylon, Colonial Office
officials recognized that the gravitation scheme was more expensive than alternatives, but they ultimately
supported it nonetheless because their engineer represented it as the best. Minutes of R. Meade, “The
Gravitation Scheme for Colombo Water Supply,” 21 April 1877, The National Archives: Public Record
Office (hereafter TNA: PRO) CO 54/510, 1877.
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Figure 2—Alexander Binnie’s Nagpur waterworks, 1870. Inmates from a nearby prison march
in place to churn many layers of clay mixed with water into a single, uniform clay wall that will
form the watertight core of the earthwork embankment (J. M. Morris, Description of the Nagpur
[Ambajhari] Water-Works [Bombay, 1872]; courtesy of the Institution of Civil Engineers).
Conybeare, proposed a gravitation scheme in Bateman’s style for Bombay in 1854.
In promoting the scheme to colonial authorities, Conybeare emphasized that it
was based on the “modern” water systems of Britain; he composed extensive
reports describing how he had been guided by the experiences of British engineers
in supplying water to cities such as Liverpool and Glasgow and assured his superiors
that his design was “that usually employed in Great Britain.”29 In 1855, Conybeare
traveled to Britain to arrange the manufacture of the scheme’s great iron main,
to tour the latest gravitation waterworks sites, and to meet with municipal water
committees and their engineers in Liverpool, Manchester, Leicester, Bristol, and
Glasgow. The Bombay government rushed the construction of his project, and it
was completed in 1858.
The gravitation scheme also spread to the empire because the students of the
scheme’s originators advanced it there. One of John Bateman’s former students,
Alexander Binnie, proposed a gravitation scheme for the central Indian city of
Nagpur (see fig. 2).30 He dammed a wide valley with a huge earthwork embank-
ment and passed the water from the new reservoir through a 2.5-mile iron pipeline
29 Henry Conybeare, On the Supply of Water to Bombay (Bombay, 1854), 54–55, 68, and Second
Report on the Supply of Water to Bombay (Bombay, 1855), 14.
30 The chief public works commissioner for the city of eighty-four thousand sought Binnie out for
his expertise and wrested him away from the Government of India’s Public Works Department in 1870.
See Central Provinces Public Works Department, Nagpur and Ambajerry Water Works (Nagpur, 1873),
3. For more on Binnie’s Nagpur project in general, see also J. M. Morris, Description of the Nagpur
(Ambajhari) Water-Works (Bombay, 1872).
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Figure 3—Top, valve tower and embankment of Vartry gravitation scheme, Dublin, 1860
(Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers [London, 1874], pl. 17; courtesy of
the Institution of Civil Engineers). Bottom, valve tower and embankment of Vihar gravitation
scheme, Bombay, 1858 (Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers [London,
1854], pl. 13; courtesy of the Institution of Civil Engineers).
to the city below.31 Binnie explained to his employers that he was working on the
model of his teachers, writing, “For a full exposition of the principles on which I
have acted . . . I invite careful study of . . . the valuable opinions expressed by
Mr. Bateman and Mr. Hawkesley.”32 Binnie completed his project in 1872.
The next year the Colonial Office hired Bateman himself to propose a system
of water supply for Colombo, the main port of the Crown Colony of Ceylon (Sri
Lanka). Bateman proposed a classic gravitation scheme for Colombo; his plan
called for the construction of a massive dam, flooding an alpine valley, and a twenty-
eight-mile pipeline to the port below. The system, in sum, was identical to any
number of waterworks (see fig. 3) that Bateman had designed in Britain, including
31 Central Provinces Public Works Department, Nagpur and Ambajerry Water Works, 4.
32 Alexander Binnie, Nagpur Water Works: Report to the Members of the Managing Committee, 30
September 1873, 11 and 13, Institution of Civil Engineers Archives, London, 1873BINCPW. Shortly
after building his Nagpur gravitation scheme, Binnie returned to England to construct a gravitation
scheme for Bradford. In 1889 Binnie became the first chief engineer of the London County Council
and proposed a gravitation scheme for London that called for the importation of water over 150 miles
from Wales—a scheme that London’s local government intended to build but for which it could not
secure authority from Parliament.
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his renowned Loch Katrine waterworks for Glasgow. Indeed, the main local news-
paper, the Ceylon Observer, made the obvious comparison to Bateman’s famous
gravitation project, proudly calling the new lake “Ceylon’s Loch Katrine”33
Another of Britain’s leading hydraulic engineers devised a plan to supply Sin-
gapore with water. In 1872, Parliament’s chief engineering inspector, Robert Raw-
linson, devised a plan to dam a stream and flood a valley in the hills above Singapore
and deliver water from the reservoir through a five-mile pipeline to the city.34 He
also devised another classic gravitation scheme for Hong Kong ten years later. This
plan called for another earthwork embankment of the standard profile in order to
flood a valley five miles south of Victoria Harbor.
At about the same time, Japan’s modernizing Meiji government asked Royal
Engineer Henry Palmer to offer a waterworks scheme for the international treaty
port of Yokohama.35 He promised “to provide Yokohama with an ample water
supply on Western principles.”36 He offered a gravitation scheme, damming a
narrow alpine valley and piping water twenty-seven miles through an iron main
to the city far below. This project was completed in 1887. Over the next few years,
Palmer was invited by the cities of Osaka, Hakodate, Kobe, and Tokyo to consult
with them on water supply and sanitation works advising them, as he wrote in the
Japan Weekly Mail, “to give immediate heed to their water supply . . . and to
trust in the experience, not of Yokohama alone, but of the rest of the civilized
world.”37
EXPORTING SOCIAL GOALS
As in Britain, engineers and officials in the empire touted the technological su-
periority of the gravitation scheme model, but they also emphasized its social
benefits.38 Henry Conybeare argued that his scheme for Bombay would benefit
public health, economic productivity, and public morality. Mustering many pages
of statistics and other evidence, he stated that the British registrar general’s mor-
tality returns for London and other cities showed that improved water supply and
drainage systems reduced rates of mortality in Britain, and while he had no census
or mortality data for Bombay, he argued that Bombay would receive the same
benefits from new water systems, writing, “I think that such English data will be
allowed to be perfectly applicable to the case.”39 Conybeare was in part motivated
by a desire to keep the working class of Bombay productive. The poor of Bombay,
like the poor of the cities of England, could be spared an untimely death by water
33 Ceylon Observer, 15 October 1888, reprinted in A Holiday Trip to Labugama: The Source of the
Colombo Water Supply (Colombo, 1891), 85–86.
34 Letter of J. McNair to the Colonial Office, 9 April 1878, 6–7, TNA: PRO CO 273/94, 1878,
vol. 2.
35 The government made its request in 1883. John Turner Tudsbery, “The Construction of the
Yokohama Water-Works,” in Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, 18 February
1890 (London, 1890), 277–89.
36 Hiro Higuchi, The Biography of Major-General H. S. Palmer, R.E., F.R.A.S. (Tokyo, 2002), 56.
37 Ibid., 72.
38 Meade, “Gravitation Scheme for Colombo Water Supply.”
39 Henry Conybeare, Report on the Sanitary State and Sanitary Requirements of Bombay (Bombay,
1852), 3.
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reform, Conybeare wrote, and “for every death occasioned by preventable causes,
there are, according to the best English medical authorities, at least fourteen cases
of illness, more or less protracted, during which the patient is not only unpro-
ductive himself, but is a burden to the productive labor of others.”40
Conybeare also cited British municipal and sanitary authorities who argued that
dirty or insufficient water led to moral disease among the working class. He quoted
preeminent sanitarian Dr. Southwood Smith who proclaimed “the immoral influ-
ence of filth” and quoted the superintendent of police in Glasgow who argued
that “much might be done to relieve the misery and repress the crime of [the]
destitute population by compelling attention to personal cleanliness.”41
In Hong Kong in 1881, Osbert Chadwick, son of arch sanitarian Edwin Chad-
wick, inspected the water supply and drainage provisions of that city. He himself
was a waterworks engineer and consulted on water supply schemes in Britain and
the colonies. He reported that “the dwellings of the Chinese working classes are
inconvenient, filthy, and unwholesome. Accumulations of filth occur in and around
them.”42 Chadwick generously allowed that “it is unjust to condemn [the Chinese]
as a hopelessly filthy race till they have been provided with reasonable means for
cleanliness.”43 Chadwick proposed a gravitation scheme that would allow author-
ities to compel the poor to accept laid-on water supplies and would make affordable
water available to all parts of the city and all parts—even upper floors—of tene-
ments. Only by requiring working-class townspeople—in Manchester or Hong
Kong—to change their water use habits could authorities achieve their goals of
safeguarding workers’ individual physical and moral health and the productivity
and safety of society at large.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE: ENVIRONMENTAL AND
SOCIAL RESISTANCE
As with so many of their economic and political policies, British environmental
policies were imposed upon the colonies with little understanding of the situation
on the ground. Officials exported this water supply scheme as if what worked in
Britain should naturally work anywhere else, but foreign landscapes proved harder
to dominate than British engineers expected. In Singapore, for example, engineers
built tall earthwork embankments on the precise model prescribed by the system’s
London designer; twice they collapsed before construction was complete. The
engineer had taken soil samples and found what he had expected, but he had not
dug deep enough—a stratum of the subsoil deep beneath the embankments was
something like quicksand. The resident engineer in Singapore subsequently re-
ported that “the soil did not at all answer the original expectations, it was treach-
40 Ibid., 22.
41 Ibid. A member of Ceylon’s legislative council argued for water reform for Colombo on the basis
of a report on the sanitary condition of Glasgow made by Dr. Lyon Playfair, an eminent sanitarian.
Councilor Dunlap is quoted in the Ceylon Observer, 5 November 1874, 566.
42 Osbert Chadwick, Report on the Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong (London, 1882), 41.
43 Ibid.
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erous and deceptive.”44 The project ran 45 percent over budget and several years
beyond the intended date of completion.45 Engineers in Colombo, Sri Lanka, also
struggled with the unanticipated behavior of the local environment. There, the
settling reservoir on the edge of the city collapsed twice as it was being filled. A
local observer wrote in a guidebook to the city that “the city reservoir . . . has
been a fiasco, cracking again and again.”46 Temperatures far higher than any the
London-based engineer had ever experienced caused the masonry and concrete
to expand and contract to a point where it cracked.47 In Yokohama, an earthquake
wreaked havoc on the gravitation waterworks. The earthquake of 1923 proved
that while it was safe to build water conduits in Britain out of brick, it was in-
advisable to do so in Yokohama where the ground was not nearly so steady. The
brick water conduits collapsed, leaving the burning city below without water for
two weeks.48
In Bombay, as in Singapore, the soil did not live up to engineers’ expectations.
In Britain, civil engineers buried pipes to keep them from freezing in cold months;
in Bombay, they would have been far better off leaving them out of the corrosive
soil. The great iron main that delivered the water from the reservoir to the city
below, buried in soil that engineers did not know was saline, began to rust severely
within a decade or two. A thick layer of rust coated great lengths of the pipe, and
in some areas the pipe corroded so badly that it could be cut with a penknife.49
The main began to burst frequently, leaving the city without water while repairs
were undertaken.50 Within Bombay’s reservoir another problem emerged that
engineers had never experienced in Britain; the intense tropical sun promoted the
rapid growth of plant life at all depths of the still, warm water, and it became
suffused with algae. Engineers later lamented that there was no mechanism for
emptying the reservoir periodically to clean out the plant matter, but, of course,
the design was based on the model from Britain—where there certainly was no
tropical sun and where algae did not engulf reservoirs.51 The algae did not impair
the operation of the Bombay gravitation scheme, but the works did become re-
nowned for the poor quality of their water.52
In addition to forcing change on uncooperative environments, these projects
had a direct influence on local societies. The water schemes involved large-scale
environmental change, they all involved permanently transforming valleys into
lakes, and many of them resulted in the displacement of indigenous people. At
Bombay, for example, the two-square-mile lake engineers created drowned the
village of Vihar.53 In each instance, a sort of “wilderness preserve” was also de-
44 Letter of J. McNair to the Colonial Office, 9 April 1878, 9–10, TNA: PRO CO 273/94, 1878,
vol. 2.
45 Colonial Office Dispatch, 1 June 1878, 1–4, TNA: PRO CO 273/94, 1878, vol. 2.
46 John Ferguson, Ceylon in the Jubilee Year (Colombo, 1887), 118.
47 A. W. Burnett, Report on the Colombo Waterworks (n.p., 1890), 76.
48 Katsumi Horie, The Earthquake Disaster and Reconstruction of Water Supply Works in Yokohama
(Yokohama, 1930), 10, 12, 39.
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marcated around the new reservoirs to keep runoff from human inhabitation and
agricultural activity from entering them. A village in proximity to Nagpur’s new
reservoir was removed in the early 1890s, and an auxiliary reservoir built in Bom-
bay’s hinterland displaced farmers for the same reason.54 Even as the governor was
touting the water scheme’s advantages for the “poor classes in the town,” Sin-
gapore officials uprooted native farmers and swineherds from the catchment area
of its new reservoir.55 Colonial officials in Ceylon removed local farmers from
proximity to Colombo’s new reservoir, and Hong Kong authorities displaced native
inhabitants who lived near its new reservoir.56 In India, the water schemes inter-
fered with religious customs, as British authorities restricted bathing and cremation
rituals in proximity to new reservoirs.57 The creation of a new waterworks at a
holy site on the banks of the River Ganges in Benares (today Varanasi) even led
to a riot in that city in 1892.58
Before the gravitation schemes delivered water to all parts of these colonial
cities, townspeople drew their water from wells and cisterns dotted throughout
the cities. But a number of municipal governments ordered these long-standing
water sources closed once the new water supplies became available. Medical officers
were eager to close wells in the cities of Britain, once municipal water supplies
became available, and public health committees from Hong Kong to Colombo to
Bombay followed suit.59 Singapore authorities, for example, closed down many
public and private wells in the decade after inaugurating its gravitation scheme.60
In Bombay, water from the new waterworks replaced many cisterns and wells that
were closed because authorities believed that they were becoming infused with
pollution and because they provided breeding grounds for mosquitoes.61 The
editors of the biweekly Native Opinion complained that “the filling up of tanks
and wells has been a hobby” of the presidencies “to the detriment of the people”
54 Annual Report of the Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India, 1892 (Calcutta, 1894),
194; Tomlinson, Bombay Municipality Water Works, 5.
55 Letter of Sir W. Robinson to the Colonial Office, 1 June 1878, 20–22, TNA: PRO CO 273/94,
1878, vol. 2. For the removal of farmers, see also Singapore Municipality, Singapore Municipality
Waterworks: Opening of New Works (Glasgow, 1912), 14.
56 For Colombo, see Holiday Trip to Labugama, 14; for Hong Kong, see Ho Pui Yin, Water for a
Barren Rock: 150 Years of Water Supply in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 2001), 30.
57 Harrison, Public Health in British India, 173.
58 Hugh Tinker, The Foundations of Local Self-Government in India, Pakistan, and Burma (London,
1954), 58. This story repeated in Harrison, Public Health in British India, 174.
59 For a few examples of health reformers’ attitudes toward well water supplies in Britain, see Malcolm
Elliot, Victorian Leicester (London, 1979), 126; Thomas Dale, On the Supply of Water to the Lancashire
and Yorkshire Towns from the Lake Districts of Cumberland and Westmoreland (London, 1866), 4–5;
John Burnet, History of the Water Supply of Glasgow (Glasgow, 1869), 2. On colonial sanitarians’ instincts
for suspecting native wells, see, for just a few examples among many, Proceedings of Third All-India
Sanitary Conference, Held in Lucknow, January 1914 (London, 1914), 188–89; Chadwick, Sanitary
Condition of Hong Kong, 17.
60 Public Utilities Board, Yesterday and Today: The Story of Public Electricity, Water, and Gas Supplies
in Singapore (Singapore, 1985), 9. For the Health Department closing wells in Singapore, see also
Arnold Wright, Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya: Its History, People, Commerce, In-
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61 Samuel Townsend Sheppard, Bombay (Bombay, 1932), 108–9; Mariam Dossal, Imperial Designs
and Indian Realities: The Planning of Bombay City, 1845–1875 (Bombay, 1991), 117.
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because it reduced available water sources.62 In Bombay, the sealing of the wells
resulted, according to the municipal secretary, in “vehement” protests motivated
by religious beliefs. “The aggrieved parties,” he wrote, “gave chapter and verse
to show that their scriptures enjoined the use of well water, and well water only,
in connection with divers ceremonies.”63 The Hindu community complained that
their religion demanded the use of well water in a number of ceremonies, while
the Zoroastrian community argued that the wells had supernatural powers or that
spirits inhabited them.64 But the city’s malarial officer was unmoved; he continued
to seal wells—and quickly became reviled among the devout.65
By closing existing wells and tanks, colonial authorities were acting directly to
change townspeople’s behavior. They were keeping Indian subjects from using
traditional water sources assumed to be dangerous, with the expectation that sub-
jects would have to use new official water supplies instead. The substitution of
new colonial water sources for traditional sources was not all pervasive and did
not happen overnight; older forms and new ones coexisted for a period, but as
wells and tanks were covered, new waterworks slowly became the only source of
the prime necessity for native city dwellers’ lives. The water systems, it follows,
made those subjects more dependent on colonial authorities; they centralized
control of the most critical element in the hands of the British, when the availability
of water had formerly been decentralized.
But much of the influence of the new water system was indirect. The gravitation
scheme helped slowly usher in new standards of normalcy or, in the words of
Scott, new “forms of life,” among city dwellers.66 Pipelines, taps, and standpipes,
along with the campaigns of sanitarians, what one Indian commentator called
deridingly, “the rules of sanitation,” invited new routines and a new scale of water
use.67 The new water technology made heavy water use as a moral endeavor pos-
sible; that is, it took an abstract, universal principle held by the British and altered
the reality of the city so that it could possibly be realized. The power of the modern
state grew through possibility; as Tal Asad explains, new possibilities were con-
structed through new methods and technologies, and the gravitation scheme was
such a technology, contributing in a piecemeal way to an urban fabric that reflected
the ideas that access to urban utilities should be easy and widespread, that former
limitations on health, growth, and free circulation imposed by nature should be
overcome, and that local government has an ameliorative rather than just coercive
role.68 The new water supplies were the first necessity and core of the modernizing
city, contributing to the evolution of a new kind of setting in which a “civilized,”
62 Native Opinion, 9 October 1892, reprinted in Report on Native Newspapers Published in the Bombay
Presidency and Berar, 1892 (Bombay, 1893), sec. 42, 16–17.
63 Rustom Pestonji Masani, Folklore of Wells: Being a Study of Water-Worship in East and West
(Bombay, 1918), 4–5.
64 Ibid., 4–9, 20.
65 Ibid., 11. Masani writes that, even after they had been filled in, townspeople continued to leave
sacrifices above two particularly important wells (ibid., 23–24).
66 Scott, “Colonial Governmentality,” 193.
67 The writer rejected the guidelines of British sanitarians as actually detrimental to public health
(Hindusthán, 18 September 1892, reprinted in Report on Native Newspapers Published in the Bombay
Presidency and Berar, 1892, sec. 39, 19).
68 Tal Asad, “Conscripts of Western Civilization,” in Dialectical Anthropology: Essays in Honor of
Stanley Diamond, vol. 1, ed. Christine Gailey (Gainesville, FL, 1992), 337.
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“improved,” or modern life could be lived—until at some indeterminate point
only a modern life could be lived.
PROTESTING THE GRAVITATION SCHEME
Some native townspeople opposed gravitation systems or called for alternatives to
the monumental schemes. Indigenous townspeople in Bombay, for example, op-
posed the creation of its gravitation scheme in late 1853. After Henry Conybeare
and his surveyors began making preliminary maps of the Vihar Valley for their
reservoir, the townspeople became alarmed at the extravagance of the project that
was about to be foisted upon them.69 Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, a leading native patri-
cian, informed the governor of Bombay that the city’s native majority was un-
convinced of the project’s necessity and resented being taxed to pay for a project
over which they had no control.70 “The project of bringing water from Vehar does
not find favor with the community in general,” he wrote in 1854.71 He added
that “many persons . . . do not think that it should rest with any Engineer or
Architect, however high his repute or abilities, to have the devising and execution
of the plans, an almost unlimited power of expending the public money, subject
only to the general control of Government, and without any control whatever on
the part of those who have to pay for the works.”72 Many townspeople, wrote Je-
jeebhoy, believed that the existing scattering of local water sources throughout
the city should be augmented by new wells, instead of supplying the town through
a single source.73 The local townspeople’s protests had no effect; the Vihar scheme
was inaugurated four years later.
From the early 1850s, the Bombay presidency envisaged Karachi as a future
gateway to western India, but it worried that an inadequate water supply would
impede the port town’s progress. The government’s commissioner in charge of
Karachi, Sir Bartle Frere, ordered Karachi’s wells examined, and the vast majority
were judged unwholesome.74 Frere decided on a scheme for piping water from
the Malir River ten miles northeast of the city in 1859. But the plan met with
scorn at a public meeting of leading indigenous townspeople, including merchants,
native magistrates, and representatives from each of the religious communities in
the town.75 “The people,” one British observer grumbled years later, “went to
the extreme of offering general opposition to any scheme for satisfying their
wants.”76 This complaint was echoed numerous times in myriad instances of sci-
entific or technological imposition and reflected a conception of Asians as innately
averse to change, no matter how patently beneficial that change might be in British
69 Letter of Henry Conybeare to Lord Elphinstone describing surveying expeditions, 4 November
1853, India Office Records MSS Eur F87/154, British Library.
70 Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy to Lord Elphinstone, 26 October 1854, India Office Records MSS Eur F87/
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eyes.77 But in the townspeople’s eyes, they had no need of such a scheme; they
protested that many households had a well located in their garden, and towns-
people who did not have their own well could draw water from the many wells
that lined the bed of the river that passed near to the town.78 The project was
shelved for many years, not because of the protests of the towns’ inhabitants but
because the Bombay government did not approve of their local administrators’
plan to finance the project through transit duties at Karachi’s port. After the British
finally did complete a Malir River scheme in 1883, British observers congratulated
themselves for improving the lot of the poor townspeople and for contributing
to their “personal cleanliness.”79
In 1874, native residents of Colombo held a public meeting near the town hall,
angry that they would be taxed to pay for a grand scheme imposed on them by
the island’s colonial authorities. They were soon chanting, “Vatura epaa [no wa-
terworks]!”80 These protestors later sent a deputation of influential community
members to meet with the colony’s governor, complaining about the water pro-
posal’s extravagance and arguing that if any project were undertaken, it should
include native laborers and engineering skill.81 The Colonial Office, however, im-
posed its own plan and engineer upon Colombo.
In Hong Kong, Chinese citizens worried that colonial officials’ plans to manage
water would mean an increase in official intrusion. Osbert Chadwick wrote that
local residents “raised objections” based on “a dread of tyrannical interference by
public officials, of ‘squeeze,’ in short.”82 Besides equating water control with social
control, citizens simply resented new taxes on water projects that they had not
asked for.83 Chadwick was not concerned about townspeople’s objections; he ended
his report on Hong Kong by writing that “the Chinese, it appears, are a most
docile people, and are accustomed for countless generations to implicit submission
to authority. Once let them see that Government is in earnest about sanitation
and that, whilst giving facilities, . . . there is a firm determination to enforce
cleanliness [and there will be little resistance].”84 Engineers discussing the com-
pletion of Hong Kong’s and Yokohama’s gravitation schemes a few years later
remarked on the hostility and “prejudice” of the “Oriental” toward the intro-
duction of water systems. They assured themselves, however, that once “the pi-
oneers of the profession . . . strenuously worked against initial difficulties and
77 See numerous expressions of this attitude among imperial officials and observers in Arnold, Col-
onizing the Body, 238 and elsewhere.
78 Rustomji, Karachi, 125.
79 This project was designed by municipal engineer James Strachan. It was not a classic gravitation
scheme in that it did not include flooding a valley or raising a lake behind an embankment. Instead,
the Karachi scheme called for the excavation of two 45,000-cubic-foot wells or tanks. The water was
imported from these tanks under gravity through a single pipeline over sixteen miles. The water was
stored in a distribution reservoir above the town and reached Karachi under sufficient pressure to reach
the upper floors of houses. Baillie, Kurrachee, 110–12.
80 Ceylon Observer, 24 October 1874, 540; Ceylon Observer, 28 October 1874, 551.
81 Ceylon Observer, 22 December 1874, 651.
82 Chadwick, Sanitary Condition of Hong Kong, 2.
83 Ibid.
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prejudices,” colonial townspeople would learn to “enjoy the benefits of the Eu-
ropean system of water distribution.”85
CONCLUSION
Royal Engineer Alexander de Courcy Scott spoke of the benefits of the “European
system of water distribution” at the same time that he spoke of the “Oriental’s”
inborn prejudice against innovation; his zealous confidence in the benefits of British
hydraulic systems was only slightly less naive than his portrayal of human character
in Asia. Gravitation projects probably did save human lives in Asia by safeguarding
drinking water from infection with cholera and other diseases. (Their benefit has
never been measured, however; no one has shown a correlation between increasing
urban populations and the waterworks of various sorts present in the majority of
large cities by around 1914.)86 De Courcy Scott and other engineers’ motivations
may have been partly, even largely, to benefit the non-European city dwellers of
cramped Hong Kong and Colombo, but the deeper effect of these projects was
to modify native people’s behavior, to guide and, as traditional water sources
disappeared, to indirectly enforce behavior that the colonial state defined as “civ-
ilized” or modern.
This study hardly represents the first discovery of the moral contradictions in-
herent in the improving projects of the British in the empire. Historians have
shown how irrigation projects promoted as the key to economic regeneration in
the countryside in fact led to environmental tragedy for Indian farmers.87 Railroads,
in addition to improving economic production and circulation, were ostensibly to
literally and figuratively eliminate distance between castes and communities by
mingling Indians of all castes in only two classes of service, but in fact rail transport
raised new barriers by catering to Europeans in first class and resigning most Indians
to poor conditions in second-class compartments and squalid station facilities.
Projects for transportation, communication, and productivity were always framed
as “essential for the advancement of the moral and material prosperity of the
people,” in the words of Manu Goswami, but as she and others show, the end of
such projects was to benefit the colonial state and ultimately to solidify it.88 The
case of the gravitation scheme adds another chapter to the history of the opposition
between the rhetoric of improvement and the reality of power; because water
systems have been perceived as self-evidently good, the power factor and social
consequences of the projects have been overlooked. Indeed, whether in Britain
or Asia, the state’s demands for acceptance of “official” water supplies became
naturalized. That demand is perceived now as the legitimate, beneficial activity of
85 “Discussion on Water-Works in China and Japan,” in Minutes of Proceedings of the Institution of
Civil Engineers, 18 February 1890, 100, 291–92.
86 Tinker, Foundations of Local Self-Government, 290–91.
87 See Whitcombe, Agrarian Conditions; John Mackenzie, “Empire and the Ecological Apocalypse:
The Historiography of the Imperial Environment,” in Ecology and Empire: Environmental History of
Settler Societies, ed. Tom Griffiths and Libby Robin (Seattle, 1997), 218–19.
88 Manu Goswami, Producing India: From Colonial Economy to National Space (Chicago, 2004),
esp. chaps. 2 and 3.
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the modern state. Understood as common sense, this activity has only recently
come under scrutiny.
Historians of science, technology, and empire have focused on projects for trans-
portation, communication, and productivity, at the expense of water supply proj-
ects. A blind spot formed by two historiographical conventions has obscured such
projects from view. The first holds that the British Empire in Asia and India in
particular did not undertake projects important to the city because the city did
not figure into its most important goal of enhancing the productivity of the hin-
terland landscape in order to increase exports and tax revenue. But the case of the
gravitation scheme demonstrates an intense interest in the development of the
imperial city, though it may have been quite narrow. The second convention, as
explained by David Arnold and Mark Harrison, holds that local government, which
undertook water supply projects in Britain, was vastly weaker in the empire, even
consciously undermined by colonial authorities, and could not take dramatic steps
toward public health.89 In the case of the gravitation scheme, action was taken by
central imperial authorities in London or regional authorities in the empire—
usually not municipal bodies—so the general rule of local government impotency
would not apply in the colonies. Mariam Dossal’s work on Bombay challenges
both of these conventions, and the case of the gravitation scheme builds on her
important work.90
This story also begins to address a lack of urban considerations in the colonial
environmental history literature. That body of work has chiefly focused on how
human land use strategies and certain plant and animal species aided in coloni-
zation.91 It has also examined the role of colonial botanical and conservation
practices, especially imperial forestry, in transforming environments and societies
in both the empire and imperial center.92 And, again, historians devoted much
attention to irrigation schemes and their effects on peasant communities.93 An
urban focus, and the case of the gravitation scheme in particular, links the city to
the countryside and shows that the imperatives of the city drove environmental
change in sometimes distant landscapes.94 The gravitation scheme certainly rev-
olutionized local hydraulic cycles to as great an extent as many irrigation projects.
It also shows that, by being dislodged from watersheds-cum-wilderness preserves,
peasants were at the mercy of the city’s environmental demands; at the same time,
this case shows that the city dweller, the water consumer, was the ultimate object
of the environmental projects of the colonial state—and not just the peasant as
the existing literature implies. And while those large projects clearly influenced
the indigenous agriculturalist, the case of the gravitation scheme reveals ways in
89 Arnold, Colonizing the Body, 274–80; Harrison, Public Health in British India, 170–83.
90 Dossal, Imperial Designs.
91 The foundational works in this genre are Alfred Crosby, The Columbian Exchange: Biological and
Cultural Consequences of 1492 (1972; repr., Westport, CT, 1990), and Ecological Imperialism: The
Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900 (Cambridge, 1986). For another important example among
many, see Elinor G. K. Melville, A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of the Conquest of
Mexico (Cambridge, 1994).
92 The most important work in this genre is Richard Grove, Green Imperialism: Colonial Expansion,
Tropical Island Edens, and the Origins of Environmentalism, 1600–1800 (Cambridge, 1995).
93 See D’Souza’s survey, “Water in British India.”
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which environmental schemes influenced city dwellers in less obvious manners by
changing patterns of water use.
Finally, the significance of the gravitation scheme stems from the fact that, unlike
the scientific forestry programs and irrigation projects undertaken in India and
elsewhere, this project was undertaken simultaneously in Britain. A strategy for
transforming urban life, even modernizing society and consolidating the state, as
Patrick Joyce and others explain, was replicated in Britain and the empire—and
often by the very same individuals and on the same grounds of sanitary and moral
theory.95 At home and abroad, rulers and reformers identified the same practical
problems, the unhygienic habits of the working class or native city dweller, and
the same abstract predicament, the moral degeneration of townspeople living
among “filth,” and applied the same environmental solutions. While the social and
political contexts were different, the strategy and consequences were the same; in
both places, British authorities saw reconfiguring the environment as a powerful
tool for reforming society, and in both places the ultimate effect of the water
system was to consolidate the authority of the modern state. Thus, Bombay and
Manchester were “colonized” in the same way.
95 In addition to Joyce, see Chris Otter, “Making Liberalism Durable: Vision and Civility in the Late
Victorian City,” Social History 27, no. 1 (January 2002): 1–15.
